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The Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project 
is developing the software and hardware technology needed to support a safe 
and precise landing for the next generation of lunar missions.  ALHAT provides 
this capability through terrain-relative navigation measurements to enhance 
global-scale precision, an onboard hazard detection system to select safe landing 
locations, and an Autonomous Guidance, Navigation, and Control (AGNC) ca-
pability to process these measurements and safely direct the vehicle to a landing 
location.  This paper focuses on the key trajectory design issues relevant to pro-
viding an onboard Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) capability for the 
lander.  Hazard detection can be accomplished by the crew visually scanning the 
terrain through a window, a sensor system imaging the terrain, or some combi-
nation of both.  For ALHAT, this hazard detection activity is provided by a sen-
sor system, which either augments the crew’s perception or entirely replaces the 
crew in the case of a robotic landing.  Detecting hazards influences the trajectory 
design by requiring the proper perspective, range to the landing site, and suffi-
cient time to view the terrain.  Following this, the trajectory design must provide 
additional time to process this information and make a decision about where to 
safely land.  During the final part of the HDA process, the trajectory design must 
provide sufficient margin to enable a hazard avoidance maneuver.  In order to 
demonstrate the effects of these constraints on the landing trajectory, a trades-
pace of trajectory designs was created for the initial ALHAT Design Analysis 
Cycle (ALDAC-1) and each case evaluated with these HDA constraints active.  
The ALHAT analysis process, described in this paper, narrows down this tra-
despace and subsequently better defines the trajectory design needed to support 
onboard HDA.  Future ALDACs will enhance this trajectory design by balanc-
ing these issues and others in an overall system design process. 
AAS 09-075 
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INTRODUCTION 
The return of humans to the Moon will require increased capability beyond that of the pre-
vious Apollo missions.  Longer stay times and greater flexibility with regard to landing locations 
are among the many improvements planned.  A descent and landing system that can land the ve-
hicle more accurately than Apollo with a greater ability to detect and avoid hazards is important 
to the development of a lunar outpost, and also for increasing the number of potentially accessible 
lunar sortie locations.  A flexible descent and landing system will allow landings in more chal-
lenging terrain and provide more opportunity with regard to mission timing and lighting consid-
erations, while maintaining safety as the top priority.  The ALHAT (Autonomous Landing and 
Hazard Avoidance Technology) project is developing a self-contained lunar landing system, 
which will address this need.  The ALHAT system will use Terrain Relative Navigation (TRN) 
techniques to enable high-precision navigation and will detect hazards at the landing site by uti-
lizing an onboard Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) sensor system.  These TRN and HDA 
capabilities operating in conjunction with the Autonomous GNC system will enable the lander to 
land safely and precisely, independent from ground control, without lunar navigation infrastruc-
ture, and without a priori knowledge of a safe landing location.  Further, the system will not be 
restricted by local lighting conditions, as was the case for Apollo1
Safety is considered the most critical issue for a crewed spacecraft system.  For the purposes 
of this paper, safety is discussed only in the context of achieving a safe landing.  Safe landing is 
defined in terms of the lander’s orientation and velocity relative to the surface and the terrain cha-
racter at that location.  Terrain is judged hazard-free if it is sufficiently level and free from any 
rocks or holes that could damage or tip the lander
.  The system is designed to 
allow for crew reach-in to the AGNC system so that the ALHAT system can support both robotic 
and crewed missions.  
The overall trajectory profile is a fundamental design parameter to the lander system design.  
The profile must be designed such that it provides a low ΔV solution to minimize consumed pro-
pellant mass during landing, while also accommodating the various other needs of the lander.  
Some of these other needs are: terrain clearance during the deorbit and powered braking phases, 
dispersion correction margin for maneuver execution and navigation errors, and increased time 
and improved perspective of the landing site during the final approach.  This paper focuses on the 
tradeoffs and constraints surrounding the design of the final approach and landing trajectory to 
support an onboard HDA capability. 
 
WHY ONBOARD HDA? 
*
One such strategy would involve a direct, physically certified safe landing location.  The ter-
rain at this selected location would be judged prior to the mission to be hazard-free and safe for 
landing.  In this scenario the lander’s primary task would be to fly to this spot precisely and ex-
ecute a safe touchdown.  To support this landing approach, high-quality terrain information 
would need to be collected via either high-resolution orbital reconnaissance or via a robotic pre-
.  Several different mission design strategies 
can be used to address landing safety.   
                                                     
* The definition of a terrain hazard is tied to the lander physical design.  The lander is said to have a specific “hazard 
tolerance” based on its ability to cope with various boulders, holes, slopes, etc. 
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cursor mission that collects this data from the lunar surface.  Another possibility would be to 
create a safe landing point (e.g. construct a landing pad) on an earlier mission.   
A second strategy would involve an indirect, statistically certified safe landing area.  This mis-
sion design concept implies that the landing area of interest has been observed with enough detail 
to statistically characterize the terrain and extrapolate to some level of probability that safe land-
ing locations are present within that area.  With this strategy, no further information on the land-
ing area is available in advance, so the mission design can follow one of two design paths.  The 
first is that the lander reaches this landing area and makes a blind landing.  This means that the 
actual landing location will be some random point within the landing area with only statistical 
insight into the terrain hazards.  For this approach to provide a high safe-landing probability, the 
local terrain character would need to be extremely benign or the lander would need a very high 
hazard tolerance.  If more risk were acceptable for the landing (i.e. lower safe-landing probability 
for a robotic lander), this blind landing approach would be feasible without imposing those terrain 
or vehicle design restrictions.  The other design path for this statistical approach would require 
that the lander identify a safe landing location, fly to this spot precisely, and then safely touch 
down.  Such a strategy would require the lander to locate and maneuver to a safe landing location 
by employing an onboard HDA capability.  An advantage of this approach is that landings are not 
as reliant on precursor missions or local infrastructure.  Landings can occur at many locations on 
the Moon by using statistical hazard frequency information gathered from lower resolution a pri-
ori terrain data.  No directly identified or prepared safe site is necessary.  Another advantage is 
that a high safe-landing probability may be achievable even in very hazardous terrain where a 
blind, random landing might have little chance of success. 
An onboard HDA capability is desirable because it enables a safe, successful landing in a 
much wider range of locations, without local infrastructure or significant precursor support mis-
sions.  In the extreme, an HDA capability also provides information about the lack of any safe 
landing site early enough in the final approach to abort the landing and save the vehicle.  The oth-
er mission design concepts mentioned here can also work for lunar landing, but lack the flexibili-
ty that an onboard HDA capability provides.  Over time, infrastructure will likely be put in place 
to either identify or prepare safe landing sites.  Once this occurs, an onboard HDA capability can 
continue to add value by providing additional robustness to the lander in the event of off-nominal 
landings. 
 
LANDING TRAJECTORY OVERVIEW  
Figure 1 shows the major phases of a typical lunar descent trajectory from a parking orbit.  For 
ALHAT this initial orbit is assumed circular with a 100 km altitude.  The deorbit burn begins the 
sequence of maneuvers necessary to land on the lunar surface.  The deorbit burn targets a 100 x 
15 km transfer orbit.  The periapse of 15 km was chosen to minimize propellant usage without 
exceeding safety margin needed for terrain clearance, as well as a passive abort in case of a failed 
Powered Descent Initiation (PDI).  The deorbit burn is followed by a coast to PDI of about one 
hour duration.  
The powered descent phase, depicted in Figure 2, begins at PDI and continues until touch-
down on the lunar surface.  The engine remains on throughout this phase.  Powered descent con-
sists of 4 sub-phases: Braking, Pitch-up, Approach, and Terminal Descent.  The objective of the 
braking maneuver is to remove the majority of the orbital velocity as efficiently as possible while 
targeting a certain altitude and range from the landing site.  The timing of PDI (i.e. the start of the 
braking maneuver) is chosen so that the trajectory meets these target conditions efficiently given 
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the vehicle’s thrust-to-weight ratio.  During braking, the engine throttle remains at a high and rel-
atively constant setting, and the vehicle is in a relatively horizontal orientation.  During this ma-
neuver, any trajectory dispersions due to burn execution errors or improved navigation state 
knowledge can be corrected.  Errors in the along-track direction are mitigated by modulating the 
engine throttle, while cross-track errors are mitigated by directing the thrust out-of-plane to the 
trajectory. 
 
Figure 1 – Major Phases for Lunar Descent Trajectory 
 
The approach phase is purposely designed to have a more vertical attitude and lower accelera-
tion level than the braking phase.  The vertical attitude provides better visibility of the landing 
area, while the lower acceleration level provides for both slower speeds and more observation 
time while approaching the target.  The intermediate pitch-up maneuver phase provides a smooth 
transition in acceleration level and vehicle attitude from the high thrust, near horizontal braking 
conditions to these desired approach conditions.  By this point in the trajectory, the closed-loop 
Guidance & Control systems have corrected trajectory dispersions to the level of the Navigation 
system accuracy. 
 
Figure 2 – Powered Descent Sub-Phases and Events 
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The objective of the final terminal descent maneuver is to descend slowly to the landing site in 
a near vertical orientation, staying directly over the landing target and nulling out any remaining 
horizontal velocity.  At this point the landing target will likely no longer be visible to the crew 
and/or sensors onboard the vehicle.  This is because the vehicle is descending directly from above 
the target, and lunar dust scattered from the engine exhaust will likely obscure the terrain below.  
Based on Apollo experience the terminal descent maneuver for ALHAT begins at 30m altitude.  
The ALHAT profile parallels the Apollo descent profile in many respects2.  The Apollo des-
cent profile included a braking phase, an approach phase, and terminal descent.  The beginning of 
the braking phase (also referred to as PDI) typically began from a 15.24 km perilune altitude el-
liptical parking orbit.  From there, the crew began PDI by entering Program 63 (P63) into the 
guidance computer.  The lunar module would continue in P63 until the guidance target for the 
beginning of the approach phase (referred to “High Gate”), at 2.2 km altitude and 7.8 km slant 
range, was reached and then automatically switch to the approach phase guidance, Program 64 
(P64).  The sudden switch to P64 at High Gate would produce a pitch-up of the vehicle to aid 
viewing of the landing site.  P64 guided the spacecraft to “low gate”, which occurred at 30 m alti-
tude and 32 m slant range.  If the crew did not intervene with the guidance programs, the comput-
er would automatically proceed to Program 65 (P65) after passing through low gate.  Velocity 
nulling guidance (P65) was the guidance computer’s fully automatic landing mode.  In this mode, 
the horizontal velocity rates were zeroed as the vehicle descended vertically at a constant rate to 
the surface.     
If fuel efficiency (low landing ΔV) were the dominant trajectory constraint during landing, the 
trajectory could be designed without an approach maneuver so that braking would extend from 
PDI until the terminal descent maneuver.  Adding the approach maneuver between the pitch-up 
and the final terminal descent compromises this optimal fuel efficiency to provide more flight 
time near the landing target and a better view of the target from the lander.  This increased time 
and improved perspective are key aspects in providing an onboard HDA capability to the lander.  
The system level trades, which ultimately determine the design of the HDA capability and conse-
quently the design of this approach maneuver, are the focus of the remainder of this paper. 
 
 
Figure 3 – HDA Activities 
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SYSTEM TRADEOFFS AND CONSTRAINTS FOR ONBOARD HDA 
To provide an onboard HDA capability, the landing system must possess the ability to detect 
terrain hazards at the targeted landing location, be capable of avoiding those hazards, and still 
make a safe, soft landing.  HDA begins after the lander has pitched up and is flying the approach 
phase, which provides an improved view of the landing area.  The HDA function can be divided 
into three activities, each of which carries its own set of tradeoffs and constraints.  These are Ha-
zard Detection (HD), Crew Interaction (CI), and Hazard Avoidance (HA).  Figure 3 highlights 
these three HDA activities along the trajectory profile. 
Hazard Detection 
Hazard Detection (HD) is the process of observing the terrain near the landing site and identi-
fying the presence of hazards.  An area that is hazard-free can generally be thought of as terrain 
that is level within some tolerance and free of small craters and boulders, which could tip the lan-
der or impinge its underside3.  As mentioned previously, Apollo accomplished this process 
through the onboard crew visually inspecting the landing area through the LM window after the 
Pitch-up maneuver.  Several computer vision strategies exist for detecting hazards, which could 
employ a camera, stereo camera, radar, or LIDAR.  ALHAT has chosen to invest in flash LIDAR 
development.  While not the only viable approach for performing HD, flash LIDAR offers signif-
icant advantages over other technologies.  It provides a direct, high-resolution measure of the ter-
rain shape for evaluation and unlike a passive sensor is not dependent on ambient light (i.e. Sun-
shine or Earthshine) to operate.  The terrain resolution of LIDAR is higher than is possible with 
radar, allowing it to image small but hazardous terrain features.  Compared to scanning LIDAR 
technology, the flash variety acquires data much more quickly, enabling more terrain to be im-
aged during the landing. 
 
Figure 4 – Notional Hazard Detection Perspective Constraints 
Several constraints need to be accommodated by the final system design for onboard HD to be 
successful.  If the HD approach relies on ambient light (i.e. passive sensors like human eyes or 
cameras), then the timing and location of the landing must be chosen properly so that this light 
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shines on the landing target with the proper elevation and azimuth.  The trajectory design must 
provide proper perspective relative to the landing area and sufficient time to accomplish this de-
tection process.  The perspective constraints break down into three parts: a maximum slant range 
from the target to view hazards, a proper target line-of-sight elevation angle, and a proper unob-
structed view of the landing target around the lander structure and/or engine plume (Figure 4).  
Time to detect hazards is needed for both the sensor hardware acquiring the data and the algo-
rithms, which must interpret the raw data.   
The numeric values placed against these constraints ultimately depends on the sensing tech-
nique used by the lander.  For example, active hazard sensors take direct measurements of the 
terrain, so their performance is best when viewing the terrain from above (i.e. trajectory descents 
more vertically toward target).  Passive sensors, on the other hand, use contrast variations and 
terrain shadows to infer the hazards and therefore are constrained to trajectory path angles slightly 
larger than the elevation angle of the ambient light, much like the constraints imposed on the 
Apollo crew4.  Another example is the available view corridor around the structure/engine-plume 
obstructions.  If this corridor is meant to support a window view, then the bounds will be limited 
by feasible window installation locations on the lander.  If the crew capsule is sitting on top of the 
fuel tanks and engine, it is unlikely that a window view could be provided down through these 
things.  If this corridor is to support a sensor, then perhaps it could be mounted on the underside 
of the vehicle to be less constrained by the lander structure.  The amount of time necessary to per-
form the HD activity can vary significantly depending on the size of the landing area to be as-
sessed, the method of acquiring the data (eyes, camera, LIDAR, etc), and the method used to 
process the terrain data. 
Crew interaction 
The Crew Interaction (CI) portion of HDA represents the time needed by the onboard crew to 
interpret the HD information (and any other landing-relevant information) and choose a safe point 
to land within the surveyed landing area.  For Apollo this activity was seamless with the HD ac-
tivity since Crew both visually inspected and evaluated the terrain for safe landing locations.  If 
the lander is operating robotically then this aspect of the HDA process becomes the responsibility 
of an onboard algorithm to select a safe landing location from landing site hazard information 
gathered by onboard sensors.  For ALHAT, this is the responsibility of the Autonomous Flight 
Manager (AFM), which uses this hazard information in conjunction with other metrics (e.g. fuel 
cost contours, proximity to targets of interest, etc.) to create a prioritized list of preferred safe 
landing locations.  This information is provided to the crew (if present) to consider in choosing 
the final landing location.  In robotic mode, the AFM automatically selects the top choice from 
this prioritized list.  ALHAT also enables the crew to use their view out the window of the land-
ing area (if properly lit) to aid in the selection of this safe landing target. 
The constraints on the CI activity from a trajectory perspective is essentially time.  The crew 
needs time to process the hazard information and make their decision.  The time required depends 
on many aspects of the crew/system interface design5
Once the safe landing target is selected, the lander must accurately divert to this point in prep-
aration for the terminal descent and touchdown.  The GNC system in conjunction with the lander 
.  For example, if the hazard information is 
in a very raw format (i.e. view out a window or camera view), then cognition time would be 
longer than if the crew is presented with a small list of discrete, vetted options.  Once the crew 
has made a decision, this information needs to be input to the lander flight computer.  The design 
of this interface would also play a factor in this CI time. 
Hazard avoidance 
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engine and RCS systems enable this Hazard Avoidance (HA) divert maneuver.  This portion of 
the HDA process impacts the trajectory design because the trajectory profile must provide for 
reasonable vehicle states (i.e. position, velocity, attitude) at the time when the HA command is 
received so that the maneuver can be completed safely and successfully.  This means that the ve-
hicle state at the beginning of the HA maneuver must not preclude the vehicle from reaching any 
safe point within the landing area.  This could happen, for example, if the vehicle were too close 
to touchdown or moving too fast toward the ground given its control authority (i.e. maximum en-
gine acceleration and attitude rate).  The constraints on the HA activity are therefore the maxi-
mum required divert distance, the lander control authority, and the allowed divert propellant 
budget.   
 
SYSTEM DESIGN PROCESS FOR ONBOARD HDA 
The constraints of these activities must be balanced against one another in order to properly 
design a trajectory that accommodates onboard HDA.  This is a particularly challenging aspect of 
the lander system design since it involves the interaction of many vehicle systems, the crew, and 
the local lunar environment in a complex, coupled fashion.  These interactions occur while the 
vehicle is moving along a high velocity trajectory with a rapidly narrowing time horizon and di-
minishing control authority needed to execute this maneuver to a safe landing location.  Since the 
lander is mass and therefore propellant constrained, loiter time near the landing site is limited.  
This time constraint means that relaxing the constraints on one of the HDA activities effectively 
tightens the constraints on the others. 
For a particular approach phase design, the trajectory provides a particular timeline, landing 
site perspective, etc.  Adopting a trajectory design would affect the HDA activities according to 
their constraints and would yield a unique HDA system performance.  To evaluate this HDA sys-
tem performance, a broad tradespace of feasible approach phase trajectory designs were created.  
These trajectories were parameterized in terms of trajectory path angle at hazard detection, slant 
range at hazard detection, and the engine acceleration profile during approach.  Figure 5 depicts 
this tradespace and shows the values that have been selected for these parameters.  The intersec-
tion of each unique value for the three parameters produces a unique trajectory profile (currently 
252 profiles exist within the tradespace).  Figure 6 defines the initial slant range and path angle.  
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Figure 5 – ALHAT Trajectory Trade Space  
The initial path angle parameter is chosen to vary through all possible values in 15-degree in-
crements.  The initial slant range varies from 500m to 2km to represent values considered reason-
able for the start of the HD activity, which for ALHAT is performed by an active sensor system.  
The maximum value for the initial slant range could be extended further from the target if neces-
sary (e.g. the Apollo approach began at approximately 8km slant range2), but for ALDAC-1 is 
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limited to 2km since this nears reasonable range limits of a LIDAR sensor system.  The accelera-
tion profile varies from a constant 1.05 lunar-g to a 2.0 lunar-g design.  On the low end, this re-
sults in a very slow, near-hovering trajectory while on the other end results in a very fast, dynam-
ic landing.  The acceleration profile is not required to be a constant, but is designed this way in-
itially for simplicity*. 
The HDA process was simulated along each of these trajectories.  Any trajectories that do not 
provide adequate HDA performance can be eliminated from the tradespace, therefore better de-
fining the approach phase design.  By following this tradespace analysis strategy, the realm of 
HDA system designs can be evaluated and traded against one another to ultimately define the best 
system-optimized HDA capability and trajectory profile design. 
 
Figure 6 – Initial Slant Range and Path Angle Defined  
 
TRAJECTORY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR ONBOARD HDA 
As of ALDAC-1, the details of the hazard detection and crew interaction activities are still un-
der investigation.  As a result, no final decisions have been made with regard to the trajectory de-
sign for ALHAT.  The ALDAC-1 analysis evaluated across the trajectory tradespace, though, has 
provided valuable insight into how the trajectory should be designed to support onboard HDA.  
The following sections present examples of the ALDAC-1 trajectory analysis†
During the HD process, proper perspective relative to the landing area and sufficient time are 
key parameters that the approach phase trajectory design must accommodate.  In terms of the tra-
 and the resulting 
insights into the system design.   
Hazard Detection Analysis 
                                                     
* Additional and potentially more complex trajectory design schemes will be considered in future ALDAC’s.  The ini-
tial strategy is to start simple and evaluate the capability of the integrated system.  Other trajectory schemes could be 
created which would tailor segments of the approach phase to better accommodate any constraints of the HDA activi-
ties. 
† The ALHAT Guidance and Control algorithms were used closed-loop in a lunar landing simulation tool to create the 
data presented in this paper. 
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jectory design, this can be described by the slant range, trajectory path angle, and look angle time 
trends relative to the target. 
This section focuses on the trends of the look angle and its impact on the trajectory design.  
The look angle is defined as the angle between the lander body-frame “down” direction (i.e. ve-
hicle longitudinal axis) and the line-of-sight to something outside of the lander.  The primary look 
angle of interest is the target look angle, defined as angle “a” in Figure 7.  This angle represents 
the direction the crew and/or hazard detection sensor must look to see the landing target relative 
to the lander orientation.  Having the proper target look angle is important since this determines 
whether the landing target is obstructed by the lander structure and/or engine plume.  
 
Figure 7 – Look Angles Defined 
The time history of the look angle is a function of the lander position and orientation relative 
to the target of interest.  The time history of the lander position and orientation are in turn a func-
tion of the approach phase trajectory design, which means that the design is important in deter-
mining both crew and sensor viewing of the landing site.  To achieve a particular approach phase 
trajectory design, the thrust acceleration magnitude and pointing direction must follow a specific 
time history profile.  Since the lander longitudinal axis defines the thrust acceleration pointing 
direction, this creates the relationship between the look angle and trajectory design. 
The most fuel-efficient approach trajectory requires a maximum thrust, nearly constant retro-
grade attitude (i.e., a continuation of the braking phase), yet produces very unfavorable look angle 
profiles.  At the expense of fuel, more favorable look angle profiles can be achieved by deviating 
from this timeline late in the braking phase.  The most straightforward deviation, which was em-
ployed by Apollo and this initial ALHAT analysis, is a planned reduction in acceleration level 
from that of the braking phase.  The reduction produces a pitch-up to a more vertical thrust atti-
tude to counter gravitational losses at the lower acceleration level.  Any acceleration that is ap-
plied laterally in a retrograde direction continues to reduce the lateral lander velocity in prepara-
tion for touchdown.  This strategy (as was done in Apollo and in this ALDAC) produces a fairly 
constant approach attitude but variable look angle profile as will be demonstrated shortly.  If 
greater control of the look angle is required, variable vertical and lateral acceleration profiles can 
be employed to either improve the initial look angle or provide a more constant look angle pro-
file.  This trajectory design strategy, though, would require more aggressive and variable ap-
proach attitude profiles and incur greater fuel penalties.  The tradeoffs among these different 
strategies will be studied in detail in future ALHAT design analysis cycles.  
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Figure 8 shows the look angle trend versus time-to-go (until touchdown) for a sample ap-
proach phase design taken from the ALHAT trajectory tradespace.  A look angle of zero degrees 
represents looking down through the floor of the lander, in the direction of the main engine ex-
haust.  A look angle of +90 degrees represents looking straight ahead relative to the lander from 
the perspective of crew standing inside.  The heavy red curve shows the target look angle trend 
with the red dot at 150 sec representing the end of the pitch-up maneuver and start of the ap-
proach phase where hazard detection begins.  The green shaded region represents the look angle 
range necessary to see the entire landing site, assuming that the site is 180 meters in diameter*.  
The blue shaded region represents the additional look angle range needed to see the lunar horizon 
simultaneously with the landing site. 
 
Figure 8 – Target Look Angle during Example Approach Phase Trajectory (1000m initial slant 
range, 45deg initial path angle, 1.05 lunar-g acceleration profile) 
Crew Considerations 
If the crew is performing the HD activity visually through a window for a specified duration, 
the minimum and maximum target look angle over that time specifies the required vertical field-
of-view (FOV) and body location for the lander window.  For example, if the crew required 30 
seconds to perform the HD operation and need to see the entire landing site and horizon simulta-
neously then the lander window requirements can be extracted from Figure 8 for this sample tra-
jectory.  In this case the window would require at least a 60 degree full-cone FOV (min look an-
gle of +25 degrees to max look angle of +85 degrees) and be centered at a 55 degrees look angle.   
For the Apollo LM, the lower window edge was a +25 degree look angle6
                                                     
* This landing site size was chosen because the ALHAT precision landing requirement is currently specified as 90 me-
ters 3-sigma in radius. 
, which meant that 
the landing target was only visible to the crew if it had a look angle greater than that value.  If the 
lander window configuration is already defined, then the target look angle trend specifies how 
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much time the crew has available to observe the landing target.  For this sample trajectory in Fig-
ure 8, a +25 degree target look angle limit would allow the crew to see the entire landing site for 
30 seconds and the exact landing target (center of the landing site) for 50 seconds.   
Sensor Considerations 
If a sensor is performing the hazard detection activity then this same target look angle data is 
useful.  If the sensor is rigidly attached to the lander then it is subject to the same FOV and body 
location/orientation issues as the crew window.  For example, a rigidly mounted camera that is 
required to observe the landing site and horizon simultaneously for 30 seconds would similarly 
need a 60-degree full-cone FOV and mounted with its boresight centered at a 55-degrees look 
angle. 
If the sensor were gimbal mounted to track the landing site during the approach phase, then 
Figure 8 shows that for this same 30 second observation period the gimbal would require an 8-
degree traverse to keep its boresight centered on the site (+41 degree to +33 degree look angle) 
with a maximum FOV of 16 degrees (full-cone) in order to see the entire landing site. 
Look Angle Sensitivities 
Figure 9 shows the sensitivity of the target look angle time history to the approach phase tra-
jectory design.  For this example, 27 trajectories from the ALHAT trajectory trade space were 
selected in order to show how the look angle trend changes when adjusting the initial approach 
phase slant range, path angle, and acceleration profile.   
Figure 9 – Sensitivity of Target Look Angle Time History to Varying Approach Phase Trajectory 
Design 
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One clearly visible trend is that using a lower acceleration profile or lengthening the initial 
slant range extends the approach phase timeline and consequently provides more time to view the 
landing site, all other parameters being equal.  Another trend is that designing the approach phase 
trajectory with a shallower initial path angle yields a larger initial look angle (generally better for 
viewing the site around lander structure and/or engine plume obstructions), but also undergoes a 
greater total look angle change during approach (possibly requiring a larger window/sensor FOV 
or gimbal traverse to view the landing site).  This same trend is observed by lowering the accele-
ration profile in order to fly this phase more slowly (i.e. blue to green to red curves).  The 75-
degree initial path angle trajectories all have target look angles of less than +15 degrees, which 
indicates that providing the crew with a window view of the target is unlikely assuming a lander 
window configuration similar to the Apollo LM.  A hazard detection sensor (or camera, in lieu of 
a window), on the other hand, could likely be mounted on the lander to allow it to see closer to a 
0 degree look angle, possibly allowing these steep trajectories to be feasible for a sensor-based 
hazard detection process.  An obstructed view due to the engine plume might still be a problem 
for these steep approach phase scenarios. 
Figure 10 – Example Target Look Angle Trends across ALHAT Trajectory Tradespace 
Figure 10 shows three example target look angle trends as a function of the entire ALHAT tra-
jectory tradespace.  The first example is the initial target look angle at the start of the approach 
phase.  This corresponds to the look angle value at the dots in the previous figure.  The color 
shading changes from blue to fuchsia for large to small look angles, respectively.  This shows that 
having a slow and shallow approach phase design (upper left region) provides a larger initial tar-
get look angle, which is consistent with the trend visible in the previous figure.  The converse 
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situation (fast and steep approach design) provides a small initial target look angle.  Figure 11 
below shows two example trajectories from the tradespace to more clearly illustrate this effect of 
the trajectory acceleration profile on the look angle behavior.  In this figure, both trajectories have 
the same initial approach phase slant range and path angle.  The only difference is that the one on 
the left flies a constant 1.05 lunar-g acceleration profile while the other flies a 2.0 lunar-g profile.  
What this shows is that for all other parameters being equal, a faster approach phase trajectory 
designs require the vehicle to be oriented more horizontally in order to reduce the high lateral 
velocity.  This more horizontal orientation results in a smaller target look angle throughout the 
approach phase (but is more fuel-efficient). 
The second and third examples in Figure 10 show the time during the approach phase when 
the target look angle is great than 25 degrees and 5 degrees respectively.  The color shading va-
ries from green (long times) to red (short times).  Any grayed-out cells in these two examples 
represent trajectories where the look angle is never greater than the selected value.  The 25-degree 
limit was selected to illustrate how a crew window-based HD strategy might constrain the ap-
proach phase trajectory design.  With this strategy, only the slower and shallower trajectories 
from this tradespace are viable options.  The 5-degree limit was selected to illustrate a sensor 
based hazard detection strategy with the assumption that a more favorable positioning of the sen-
sor as compared to a window will result in a more lenient look angle constraint.  With both of 
these examples, further narrowing of the trajectory tradespace will occur as the time required for 
viewing the target increases.  For example, if both scenarios required at least 30 seconds to per-
form HD, then only the trajectory cases noted in yellow-green to green shades would be viable.  
To put these times in context with the early Apollo trajectory design, the Apollo look angle was 
greater than 25 degrees for approximately 35 seconds beginning at 1km slant range and approx-
imately 60 seconds beginning at 2km6.  This result compares favorably with the similar ALHAT 
approach trajectory (e.g. 41 seconds for the 1km slant range, 15-degree path angle, 1.1 lunar-g 
acceleration profile.  67 seconds for the 2km slant range, 15-degree path angle, 1.1 lunar-g acce-
leration profile.). 
Figure 11 – Comparison of Lander Orientation and Target Look Angle Behavior as a Function of 
Acceleration Profile 
This section discussed how the target look angle and landing site FOV trends represent impor-
tant perspective and timing issues relevant for the hazard detection activity.  Further, it showed 
how specific look angle requirements, based on a particular HD technique, would constrain the 
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trajectory design.  There are other perspective and timing issues relevant to HD that would im-
pose additional constraints on the trajectory design.  One example is the slant range time history, 
which will affect the sensor power to image the target and crew/sensor resolution of the terrain at 
the target.  Another is the trajectory path angle time history, which determines the perspective 
relative to the local horizontal and effects how an active sensor signal bounces back from the 
ground to the lander and how a passive sensor/crew see the terrain in terms of local lighting and 
shadows.  Similar to the look angle constraints, both the initial value and amount of change over 
time for the slant range and path angle affect the HD activity.  Consideration of these perspective 
and timing issues relevant to the selected HD technique will impose constraints to the approach 
phase design and lead to an appropriate trajectory to support onboard hazard detection. 
Hazard Avoidance Analysis 
Once the hazards have been detected and the crew or AFM have selected a safe landing point, 
the lander must execute a hazard avoidance divert maneuver to reach this point.  The constraints 
on this HA activity are the maximum required divert distance, the lander control authority, and 
the allowed divert propellant budget.  The maximum divert distance will be a requirement im-
posed on the lander and will be limited by the terrain area scanned for hazards.  For ALHAT this 
means the lander will need to be capable of diverting up to the edge of the area scanned by the 
hazard detection LIDAR system, which currently is assumed to range from 45m to 360m across.  
The other two HA constraints are driven by the lander design.  For ALDAC-1 the lander control 
authority and divert propellant budget were significant, but the guidance mechanization for this 
analysis was limited to a fixed approach phase time based on the nominal trajectory design.  The 
impact of this is that the lander must receive the divert command sufficiently early for a given 
trajectory design and divert distance so that it is complete before the terminal descent altitude is 
reached.  Future ALDACs will allow greater flexibility in guidance so that the approach phase 
time can be extended as needed to execute a divert.  This means that the HA divert maneuver can 
be any distance and last any amount of time as long as there is sufficient propellant to execute the 
maneuver.  Since the propellant budget for this maneuver will be limited, guidance will still re-
quire that the divert command be received sufficiently early to limit propellant consumption. 
This section focuses on the propellant (ΔV) use and timing related to the HA divert maneuver 
for ALDAC-1.  Figure 12 shows the total lunar landing ΔV and approach phase duration for each 
of the trajectories within the ALHAT trajectory tradespace.  These data correspond to nominal 
trajectories with no HA maneuver.  The nominal ΔV is measured from the deorbit burn to touch-
down.  The approach phase duration is measured as the time between the end of pitch-up and 
terminal descent.  Figure 12 shows that there is a significant variation of the nominal required 
ΔV, which translates into required propellant.  Based on this information alone, the trajectory de-
sign could be further constrained if the landing ΔV budget is known.  The figure also shows how 
significant the approach phase duration varies across the tradespace.  There is an order-of-
magnitude difference in the nominal duration from the minimum to the maximum values. 
For the HA maneuver, a key metric of interest is the maximum time the maneuver can be de-
layed while still being able to achieve some maximum divert distance.  This maximum delay time 
is important because it is during this period that the hazard detection and crew interaction func-
tions must occur for onboard HDA to be successful.  If the combined HD and CI time exceed this 
maximum delay time, then the lander risks not being able to reach the selected safe landing point.  
As mentioned previously, future ALDACs will allow guidance to extend the approach phase 
timeline as needed to accomplish a HA divert.  For that situation, the maximum delay time equals 
the nominal approach phase duration shown in Figure 12.  For ALDAC-1, though, the maximum 
delay time was a function of the divert distance.   
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Figure 12 – Nominal Landing ΔV and Approach Phase Duration across ALHAT Trajectory Tra-
despace 
Table 1 provides a summary of the results for an ALDAC-1 study, which determined the max-
imum delay time and resulting additional ΔV cost to execute maximum HA diverts for each tra-
jectory within the trajectory tradespace7
Table 1
.  The first column of the table is the size of the region 
scanned for hazards by the HD sensor system.  The second column is the divert distance which 
corresponds to half of the HD area’s diameter minus the lander’s footprint radius.  For this exam-
ple, the lander radius is assumed to be 10 meters, which also includes a buffer around the vehicle 
to account for touchdown accuracy limitations.  The next column provides time metrics on the 
reduction in the approach phase duration needed to enable this HA divert.  The last column pro-
vides metrics on the additional ΔV cost incurred by this max delayed max divert.  This summary 
table is provided instead of the detailed trajectory tradespace results because the values only 
weakly correlate with the variations in the approach phase trajectory design.  The dominant factor 
affecting these divert-related times and ΔV costs for ALDAC-1, then, is primarily the required 
max divert distance.  The total HA divert performance results are found by combining the divert 
data from  with the nominal data found in Figure 12.  For example, the maximum delay 
time before executing the HA divert (to allow for the HD and CI activities) is found by subtract-
ing the Table 1 time values (column 3) from the nominal approach phase times from Figure 12.  
By comparing the magnitude of the data between the nominal and divert data, it is clear that the 
nominal performance trends dominate the overall HA divert performance results. 
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Similar to the look angle durations presented in Figure 10, this max delay max divert data can 
be used to constrain the trajectory design once the time requirements for the HD and CI activities 
are defined.  For example, if detecting terrain hazards and selecting a safe site takes at least 40 
seconds, then none of the trajectories shaded orange in Figure 12 are viable.  Another issue is that 
larger areas scanned for hazards both require more time to complete the HD/CI activities and 
have less delay time available due to the larger required divert. 
 
Table 1 – Summary of Hazard Avoidance Performance Results for Max Delayed Max Divert 
Hazard Detec-
tion Area Di-
ameter [m] 
Divert 
Distance 
[m] 
Approach Phase Time 
Reduction Due to HA 
Divert [s] 
{ mean (min–max) } 
Additional ΔV Cost Due 
to HA Divert [m/s] 
{ mean (min–max) } 
45 12.5 6.1 (1.9–7.2) 1.5 (0.8–2.0) 
90 35 8.5 (5.1–9.2) 5.8 (4.8–7.0) 
180 80 11.6 (8.7–13.1) 12.7 (10.7–15.3) 
360 170 15.2 (12.5–17.8) 25.0 (18.8–30.1) 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper focused on the tradeoffs and constraints surrounding the design of the final ap-
proach and landing trajectory to support an onboard HDA capability for a future lunar lander.  
The overall trajectory profile is a fundamental design parameter to the lander system and must be 
designed such that it provides a low ΔV solution to minimize consumed propellant mass during 
landing.  The trajectory profile must also accommodate the various other needs of the lander, in 
this case onboard HDA.  Hazard detection can be accomplished by the crew visually scanning the 
terrain through a window, a sensor system imaging the terrain, or some combination of both.  The 
trajectory design will be greatly influenced by the hazard detection activity since it will supply 
the proper perspective, proper range to the landing site, and sufficient time to view the terrain.  
Once the terrain has been viewed, the trajectory design must provide additional time to process 
this information and allow a decision to be made about where to safely land.  Finally, the trajecto-
ry design must provide sufficient margin to enable a hazard avoidance maneuver in order to reach 
this safe landing location. 
A tradespace of feasible approach phase trajectory designs were investigated to best under-
stand the impacts and trades associated with a lunar lander HDA capability.  These trajectories 
were parameterized in terms of trajectory path angle at hazard detection, slant range at hazard 
detection, and the engine acceleration profile during approach.  Each of the values were varied to 
represent the broadest range of feasible trajectory designs to be considered by a future lunar lan-
der in balance with projected capabilities of a future hazard detection system.  On one end of the 
spectrum, a very slow, near-hovering trajectory while on the other end, a very fast, dynamic land-
ing.  Regardless where in the spectrum a particular trajectory design is chosen, adopting it affects 
the hazard detection and avoidance activities according to their constraints, which yields a unique 
HDA system performance. 
The time history of the lander position and orientation are a function of the approach phase 
trajectory design, which are important in determining both crew and sensor viewing of the land-
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ing site.  To achieve a particular approach phase design, the thrust acceleration magnitude and 
pointing direction must follow a specific time history profile.  Since the lander longitudinal axis 
defines the thrust acceleration pointing direction, this creates the relationship between the look 
angle and trajectory design.  Having the proper target look angle is important since this deter-
mines whether the landing target is obstructed by the lander structure and/or engine plume.  The 
most fuel-efficient approach trajectory requires a maximum thrust, nearly constant retrograde atti-
tude (i.e., a continuation of the braking phase), yet produces very unfavorable look angle profiles.  
If greater control of the look angle is required, variable vertical and lateral acceleration profiles 
can be employed to either improve the initial look angle or provide a more constant look angle 
profile.  This trajectory design strategy, though, would require more aggressive and variable ap-
proach attitude profiles and incur greater fuel penalties. 
If the crew is performing the hazard detection activity visually through a window for a speci-
fied duration, the minimum and maximum target look angle over that time specifies the required 
vertical field-of-view (FOV) and body location for the lander window.  Using a lower accelera-
tion profile or lengthening the initial slant range extends the approach phase timeline and conse-
quently provides more time to view the landing site, all other parameters being equal.  Designing 
the approach phase trajectory with a shallower initial path angle yields a larger initial look angle 
(generally better for viewing the site around lander structure and/or engine plume obstructions), 
but also undergoes a greater total look angle change during approach (possibly requiring a larger 
window/sensor FOV or gimbal traverse to view the landing site).  A hazard detection sensor (or 
camera, in lieu of a window), on the other hand, could likely be mounted on the lander to allow it 
to see closer to a 0-degree look angle, possibly allowing steep trajectories to be feasible for a sen-
sor-based hazard detection process.  An obstructed view due to the engine plume might still be a 
problem for these steep approach phase scenarios. 
Once the hazards have been detected and the crew or AFM have selected a safe landing point, 
the lander must execute a hazard avoidance divert maneuver to reach this point.  The constraints 
on this hazard avoidance activity are the maximum required divert distance, the lander control 
authority, and the allowed divert propellant budget.  The maximum divert distance will be a re-
quirement imposed on the lander and will be limited by the terrain area scanned for hazards.  
Analysis within this paper has shown how significant the approach phase duration varies across 
the tradespace indicating an order-of-magnitude difference in the nominal duration from the min-
imum to the maximum values.  Additionally, if the combined hazard detection and crew interac-
tion time exceed a maximum hazard avoidance delay time, then the lander risks not being able to 
reach the selected safe landing point. 
This paper discussed how the target look angle and landing site FOV trends represent impor-
tant perspective and timing issues key to the hazard detection activity.  Further, it showed how 
specific look angle requirements, based on a particular hazard detection technique, would con-
strain the trajectory design and that for all other parameters being equal, a faster approach phase 
trajectory requires the vehicle to be oriented more horizontally in order to reduce the high lateral 
velocity.  This more horizontal orientation results in a smaller target look angle throughout the 
approach phase but has the attractive quality of being more fuel-efficient. 
Hazard detection and avoidance, albeit as demonstrated by Apollo or on our future return to 
the Moon, will continue to be a critical activity for all safe lunar landings.  Accordingly, lunar 
landing trajectory designs that support onboard HDA must be examined in an overall system de-
sign process to develop a robust, safe landing technique for the next generation of lunar landing 
vehicles. 
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ACRONYM LIST 
AFM: 
AGNC: 
ALDAC: 
ALHAT: 
CI: 
FOV: 
GNC: 
Autonomous Flight Manager  
Autonomous Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
ALHAT Design Analysis Cycle 
Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology 
Crew Interaction 
Field of View 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
HA:  
HD:  
HDA:  
LIDAR:  
LM:  
PDI:  
TRN: 
Hazard Avoidance 
Hazard Detection 
Hazard Detection and Avoidance 
Light Detection and Ranging 
(Apollo) Lunar Module 
Powered Descent Initiation 
Terrain Relative Navigation 
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